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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











ALEXANDER H. LINDSAY, JR.; LINDSAY LAW FIRM; 
JOSEPH VICTOR CHARLTON; PATRICIA LINDSAY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-00289) 
District Judge:  Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 15, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, VANASKIE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 







 Jean Coulter appeals orders of the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed her complaint as violative of a previously-
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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entered pre-filing injunction, and which denied her post-judgment motions.  We will 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. 
 In March of this year, Jean Coulter filed a complaint in the District Court against 
Defendants Alexander H. Lindsay, Jr., the Lindsay Law Firm, Joseph Victor Charlton, 
and Patricia Lindsay.  On March 6, 2015, the District Court dismissed the complaint with 
prejudice, finding that it was violative of the Court’s December 18, 2012 Order, filed in 
Civil Action Nos. 12-1050 and 12-1241, designating Coulter as a vexatious litigant.  
Coulter filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied on 
March 25, 2015.  Coulter filed an “Emergency Motion for Recusal and Motion for 
Special Relief” (“recusal motion”), which the District Court denied by text order on April 
2, 2015, and a “Motion to Amend the Findings—Pursuant to Rule 52” (“motion to 
amend”), which the District Court denied by text order on April 10.  Coulter filed a notice 
of appeal on Monday, May 4, 2015.    
 We have jurisdiction to consider that appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but the 
scope of our review is limited.1  Coulter’s appeal is timely as to two of the District 
Court’s orders:  the one denying her recusal motion and the one denying the motion to 
amend.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 6(a)(1)(C).  Coulter’s notice of 
appeal could be effective to appeal the earlier orders only if one of her post-decision 
                                              
1 Although Appellees do not contest our jurisdiction to consider all of the orders that 
Coulter seeks to appeal, we have the obligation to sua sponte consider our jurisdiction.  




motions tolled the time to appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).  Neither the motion to 
recuse nor the motion to amend tolls the time to appeal.   
 A motion to recuse is not one of those motions listed in Rule 4(a)(4) of the Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure as the type of motion that tolls the time to appeal from the 
initial judgment.  See Turner v. Evers, 726 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1984).  And Coulter’s 
motion to amend, while purporting to be one of those tolling motions, see Rule 4(a)(4) 
(time to appeal tolled by timely filing of motion “to amend or make additional factual 
findings under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] Rule 52(b)”), is in reality another motion asking the 
District Court to reconsider its March 6, 2015 decision.  The motion asks the District 
Court to revise its “facts” and argues that the District Court was mistaken about what it 
deemed to be part of the “public record.”  But the District Court’s March 6 decision does 
not include “findings of fact,” and it does not rely on a consideration of what is a matter 
of “public record” in Pennsylvania.  Instead, that decision considers the allegations of 
Coulter’s complaint and whether the complaint runs afoul of the District Court’s 
December 18, 2012 Order.  Coulter’s motion to amend is an attempt to have the Court 
reconsider its determination that the complaint is barred as vexatious.2  However, a 
second motion to reconsider is not a tolling motion listed in Rule 4(a)(4).  See Turner, 
726 F.3d at 114; Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1997); see also 
                                              
2 The motion might also be characterized as a grossly untimely attempt to challenge the 
District Court’s December 18, 2012 Order, which did mention the phrase “public record.”  
But Coulter had the opportunity to challenge that order in earlier appeals, and in each 
appeal, we summarily affirmed the District Court’s judgment.  See Coulter v. Ramsden, 
C.A. No. 13-1077, and Coulter v. Mahood, C.A. No. 13-1078, (order entered Aug. 1, 
2013, petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc denied Oct. 23, 2013). 
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Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 208 (3d Cir. 2002) (appellate court is free to 
recharacterize motion to match the substance of the relief sought).  We thus have 
jurisdiction to consider only the District Court decisions denying the motion to recuse 
and the second motion for reconsideration (what Coulter termed a motion “to amend”). 
II. 
 Our review of both the District Court’s denial of the second motion for 
reconsideration and the motion for recusal is for abuse of discretion.  See Max’s Seafood 
Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999) (motion for 
reconsideration); Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (motion for recusal).  Motions for reconsideration are appropriate only to 
rectify plain errors of law or to offer newly discovered evidence, and they may not be 
used to relitigate old matters or to present evidence that could have been offered earlier.  
Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985); Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008).  Coulter’s motion clearly does not meet these 
requirements.  In fact, the motion itself acknowledges that in previous cases she had 
made “strenuous objections” to the District Court’s use of certain facts in the public 
record, and that she had argued in those cases that the records should have been under 
seal and were therefore not “public.”  As Coulter was attempting to relitigate issues 
decided in a previous case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it declined 
to grant Coulter’s motion. 
 As for the motion to recuse, Coulter’s allegations of impartiality amount to 
nothing more than dissatisfaction with Judge Bissoon’s legal rulings.  See Securacomm 
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Consulting, 224 F.3d at 278 (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure with 
legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal, and we reiterate that principle 
here.”) (citation omitted).  The District Court thus did not abuse its discretion when it 
denied the motion to recuse.3 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
                                              
3 Coulter’s recusal motion also included a motion for “special relief,” seeking to have the 
District Court seal an “adoption record” that she alleges is part of the District Court 
record in previous cases.  As this is another untimely attempt to relitigate issues decided 
in prior cases, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.     
